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Several publications have been dedicated to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness in 
recent years, all of them dealing with its later phases. The origins and early history of 
this doctrine has been largely neglected, the most important earlier studies being some 
articles by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, written more than half a century ago. The present 
book is therefore a most welcome addition to the scholarly literature, filling a major gap 
in Buddhist studies. Its author, Alexander von Rospatt (henceforth AvR), obviously 
aware of the neglect which this particular topic has suffered, has made an appreciable 
effort to rectify the situation. His book discusses an impressive array of passages from 
early Buddhist literature, covering most notably Abhidharma and early Yogåcåra. Many 
important passages are identified and discussed; they are translated, usually in the 
footnotes, from the Sanskrit, Påli, Chinese or Tibetan, thus providing future research 
with a rich collection of material. Given the enormous dimensions of the literature dealt 
with, it is but natural that the author observes on several occasions that further research 
may have to be carried out in order to settle this or that point. All in all, however, with 
this book research into the origin and early history of Buddhist momentariness is 
catapulted, after what seemed to be a still-birth, into adulthood. 
 The main portion of the book is divided into two parts. The first of these dis-
cusses the early phase as we know it through the texts. The earliest clear references to 
the doctrine of momentariness appear to occur in the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å of the 
Sarvåstivåda tradition, where this doctrine seems to be taken for granted. Other texts of 
the same tradition pay little attention to it. A study of the saµsk®talak∑aˆas leads AvR 
to the conclusion that these did not, originally, presuppose the doctrine of 
momentariness. This doctrine appears however regularly in texts of the early Yogåcåra 
school. 
 Part two considers a number of possibilities concerning the possible origins of 
the doctrine of momentariness. No final solution is offered here, but AvR considers it 
likely that the doctrine is primarily based on the analysis of change. Other possibilities 
are explored, such as "the deduction of momentariness from the momentariness of the 
mind", "the deduction of momentariness from destruction", "the experience of 
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momentariness". They are dealt with in separate chapters which carry those names. 
However, the conclusion of the book is embodied in the "contention that the doctrine of 
momentariness is primarily based on the analysis of change in terms of substitution and 
on the conviction that things are always changing" (p. 217). 
 An appendix provides an annotated translation of the analysis of anityatå and of 
the proof of momentariness in the fourth chapter of the Hsien-yang, an early Yogåcåra 
text. This translation, AvR notes in his introduction, "may serve as a convenient 
summary of, or — in case of the reader who decides to skip over this or that chapter of 
the present study — introduction to, the treatment of the doctrine of momentariness in 
the early Yogåcåra school". A detailed bibliography and a number of indexes complete 
the volume. 
 The observation that this book contains a large collection of relevant passages 
from the early texts bears repetition. These passages, always translated, are very 
carefully discussed, and evidence is weighed with the greatest possible circumspection. 
In spite of this, one key aspect may not have received the attention it deserves. This is 
the intellectual context in which this doctrine appears to have arisen. 
 This intellectual context may be described with the term ‘dharma-theory’. It is 
precisely in the Sarvåstivåda tradition, the very same tradition in which we find the 
earliest testimony for the doctrine of momentariness, that the dharma-theory has been 
given a new impetus (see below). It is also in texts of this school — for the first time 
perhaps in Dharmaßre∑†hin's Abhidharmah®daya — that the idea of material atoms 
makes its explicit appearance. Both the dharma-theory and the idea of material atoms 
give expression to the fundamental tendency to analyse things right down to their final 
constituents. The ultimate constituents, moreover, are all that really exists; composite 
objects are nothing but names. This idea may find its clearest, but perhaps not even 
earliest, expression in the oldest parts of the Milindapañha, it also shows up in 
Sarvåstivåda texts like the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å. Wouldn't it seem reasonable to link these 
two developments in Sarvåstivåda, the search for ultimate constituents on the one hand, 
and the preoccupation with moments — the "ultimate constituents" of time — on the 
other? AvR rejects this possibility implicitly already at the beginning of his 
introduction, where he claims that spatial atomism is "independent from this doctrine of 
momentariness"; he gives no arguments to support this position. Atoms are not 
mentioned again in his book, except in connection with the idea that one moment is the 
time required for an atom to leave one point and reach the next one (p. 97 n. 215, p. 103 
f.); AvR thinks that this idea has been borrowed from Jainism. The link between 
momentariness and the dharma-theory is not explored either. The parallelism between 
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the two yet suggests that the doctrine of momentariness, like the developed dharma-
theory, might be a product of (Sarvåstivåda) Abhidharma. 
 AvR has a different idea. His impression is rather that the notion of momentari-
ness originated outside the mainstream Abhidharma tradition (p. 27, with  n. 42). He 
bases this impression on the fact that the notion is not referred to in texts which may be 
younger than the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å, which does refer to it. Momentariness is not referred 
to in the Abhidharmåm®tarasa of Gho∑aka and in the Abhidharmasåra (= -h®daya) by 
Dharmaßr¥ (= Dharmaßre∑†hin). Moreover, "[in] other post-canonical Abhidharma texts 
of the Sarvåstivåda tradition ... the doctrine of momentariness hardly features at all, 
though there can be little doubt that it was known and not rejected. In the 
*Saµyuktåbhidharmah®daya[ßåstra](?) ... ascribed to Dharmatråta and in the 
Abhidharmåvatåraßåstra by Skandhila, for instance, the doctrine of momentariness, 
though presupposed in at least one passage in each text, seems to be ignored for the 
most part. This is particularly stunning in the case of Skandhila who is 
contemporaneous with Vasubandhu and Saµghabhadra ... and hence must have been 
acquainted with the debates on momentariness as they are recorded in the 
[Abhidharmakoßa] and in the [*Nyåyånusåra]." 
 AvR offers the ‘assumption’ that among the Sarvåstivådins the doctrine of mo-
mentariness first gained ground in a milieu that is closely connected to the tradition 
recorded in the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å, but far removed from the commentary tradition associ-
ated with Dharmaßr¥ and Gho∑aka. Alternatively, he considers the possibility (less 
favoured by him) that all passages testifying to the notion of momentariness in the 
(Mahå-)Vibhå∑å were only added after its compilation in (probably) the second century 
C.E. 
 There is of course a much simpler solution, which has, however, some serious 
consequences. It is at least conceivable that the authors of all the texts mentioned above 
accepted the doctrine of momentariness more or less as a matter of course, but did not 
write about it, perhaps because momentariness did not directly affect their discussion. 
This doctrine may very well have been basic knowledge in the Sarvåstivåda tradition, 
which needed, at least within the tradition itself, no further proof. This is the impression 
the later texts create, and I see no reason not to accept the same for the earlier ones. 
 The consequence of this solution is, of course, that the non-mention of this doc-
trine in texts older than the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å does not, by itself, justify us to conclude 
that the doctrine was not yet accepted by their authors. Be it noted that AvR is careful 
not to draw such a conclusion, pointing out that "it cannot be excluded completely that 
the momentariness of all conditioned entities is presupposed in some ... portions of the 
[Jñånaprasthåna] or even in one of the other (exclusively earlier) canonical Abhidharma 
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works of the Sarvåstivådins". It must here be added that, in view of the above, the mo-
mentariness of all conditioned entities cannot be totally excluded, even if these texts do 
not contain portions which demonstrably presuppose it. This, of course, makes the 
search for the origin of this doctrine particularly difficult. 
 Here, however, we have to consider the question how new ideas become gener-
ally accepted. How do we have to imagine that the notion of momentariness of all 
conditioned entities spread, supposing that indeed someone hit upon this idea on the 
basis of the analysis of change in terms of substitution and of the conviction that things 
are always changing. If this was a new idea, it must somehow have been propagated, 
and subsequently accepted by the school. AvR discussions create the impression that 
this idea spread almost surreptitiously, first perhaps among the Sarvåstivådins, and then 
also among other Buddhists. It is not, of course, possible to prove that this did not 
happen in this way. For a doctrine of such fundamental importance, and which shows 
such fundamental similarities with the equally important dharma-theory, such a 
development seems to me however highly unlikely. 
 If we consider the possibility, not really envisaged by AvR, that the doctrine of 
momentariness was established school-doctrine at the time of the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å, the 
question presents itself when this might have started? Seen in this way, one answer rec-
ommends itself strongly. It is known that the tradition preceding classical Sarvåstivåda 
has undergone at least one major overhaul. It is the introduction of the Pañcavastuka, a 
completely new categorisation of dharmas, accompanied by the insertion — or perhaps: 
redefinition — of a number of dharmas. It is true that subsequent authors tend to return 
to the older Pañcaskandhaka, but without completely rejecting the Pañcavastuka and the 
innovations it entailed. Is it conceivable that the introduction of the Pañcavastuka 
included the introduction of the doctrine of momentariness of all conditioned entities? 
 Among the new dharmas introduced in connection with the Pañcavastuka we 
find the three or four saµsk®talak∑aˆas "marks of conditioned [entities]". AvR dedicates 
a chapter to these marks, in which he also pays attention to their occurrence in the early 
Sarvåstivåda texts. We find here the following passage (p. 46): 
 
[The doctrine of the saµsk®talak∑aˆas as postulated by the Sarvåstivådins] is ... 
already to be found in the Abhidharmasåra by Dharmaßr¥ ... and reproduced 
among others in the Abhidharmåm®tarasaßåstra by Gho∑aka ... In this classic 
form there is no trace of the conception that the conditioned entities are 
momentary. By contrast, the very fact that they are said to endure and to 
undergo change presupposes that they exist for a stretch of time. Moreover, the 
terminology chosen by the Sarvåstivådins (viz. birth [jåti] for origination and 
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age [jarå] for change) leaves no doubt that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas originally 
referred to the entire span of one existence. This is confirmed by the definition 
in the Pañcavastuka that "birth causes the origination of the skandhas" (i.e. the 
groups of factors constituting a sentient being) and that "age causes the 
transformation (lit. maturation) of the skandhas" ... That the saµsk®talak∑aˆas 
were originally correlated to existence over a span of time follows, furthermore, 
from the fact that the [Mahåvibhå∑å] not only treats the saµsk®talak∑aˆas in 
terms of momentariness but also in terms of extended existence, though with the 
qualification that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas in this context are only conceptually 
given and not to be identified with the causally efficient saµsk®talak∑aˆas which 
qualify momentary conditioned entities ... 
 
This is a key passage in that it tries to prove that there is no link between the 
saµsk®talak∑aˆas as conceived in the original Pañcavastuka and the doctrine of momen-
tariness. The passage deserves therefore detailed attention. I do not think that its argu-
ments are conclusive. 
 Take first the remark to the extent that in the doctrine of the saµsk®talak∑aˆas as 
found in the Abhidharmasåra and in the Abhidharmåm®tarasaßåstra there is no trace of 
the conception that the conditioned entities are momentary. This is hardly surprising. 
These are two of the texts mentioned earlier which do not mention momentariness even 
though it must be assumed — esp. in the case of the second of the two — that they 
accepted this doctrine. And even if they contain no trace of the conception that the 
conditioned entities concerned are momentary, they contain no trace either, so far as I 
am aware, that the conditioned entities have an extended existence. 
 In connection with the remark "the very fact that [the conditioned entities] are 
said to endure and to undergo change presupposes that they exist for a stretch of time", 
AvR cites, in a footnote, the following explication from the Abhidharmasåra, which 
according to him clearly documents that remark: "All conditioned entities have four 
marks, [namely] origination, duration, transformation and destruction. Because it arises 
in the world (?): origination; because having arisen its essence is established: duration; 
because having endured it decays: change; because having been transformed it perishes: 
destruction." This explication certainly suggests that the four dharmas did not exist 
simultaneously, but this does not necessarily imply that the conditioned entities exist for 
a stretch of time. Consider, to begin with, that many Buddhists, among them some 
whose opinions are recorded in the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å, looked upon a moment as having a 
fixed duration of time. This is shown by AvR in his chapter I.E called "The various 
definitions and usages of the term k∑aˆa in Buddhist sources". It is easily imaginable 
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that an entity comes into existence at one moment, exists the next moment, and 
disappears at the third one. Seen this way, origination, duration and destruction are not 
simultaneous, yet one could reasonably maintain that the entity concerned is 
momentary. The fact that the Sarvåstivådins recognize four, rather than three, marks, 
does not seriously affect this, for duration (sthiti) and age (jarå) do not necessarily have 
to be assigned different moments. Alternatively, the position may have been more or 
less similar to a certain position found in more recent texts. The Sarvåstivådins in the 
(Mahå-)Vibhå∑å and later give duration an exceptional position in maintaining that 
duration — unlike the other marks — "does not effect a change of the temporal 
localization of the qualified entity" (p. 42 n. 79). 
 AvR also draws attention to the position defended in the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å, 
according to which the saµsk®talak∑aˆas, though simultaneous, are not causally active 
at the same time (p. 50): "The mark of origination, so the line of reasoning, discharges 
its function when the qualified entity arises, whereas the marks of transformation and 
destruction — the mark of duration is not envisaged because the discussion refers to the 
Trilak∑aˆasËtra where this mark does not feature — operate simultaneously at the time 
when the entity concerned undergoes destruction. Thus it was ensured that the marks of 
origination and destruction do not function at the same time and, to accommodate the 
doctrine of momentariness, that the qualified entity does not exist at any other time but 
that of its origination and destruction. This still invited the charge that the qualified 
entity is all the same no longer momentary as it thus exists at two necessarily distinct 
points of time. In order to preclude this, the moment was defined as the time taken by 
the completion of origination and destruction." If such a position was still possible at 
the time of the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å, something more or less similar — i.e., successive 
activity, or even successive existence in spite of momentariness — is certainly 
conceivable for a period long before it. 
 It seems particularly hazardous to draw conclusions from the terminology used. 
AvR maintains in the above passage that terms like ‘birth’ (jåti) for origination and 
‘age’ (jarå) for change "leave no doubt that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas originally referred to 
the entire span of one existence". This is plausible enough as long as one discusses the 
real original use of these terms in the Buddhist tradition. But one cannot seriously 
maintain that these terms were used for the first time in the context of the Pañcavastuka. 
Terms sanctified by tradition were maintained, but this does not guarantee that their 
original meaning was preserved. This does not necessarily imply that the original 
meaning was no longer known. When, therefore, AvR claims that "the fact that the 
[(Mahå-)Vibhå∑å] not only treats the saµsk®talak∑aˆas in terms of momentariness but 
also in terms of extended existence, though with the qualification that the 
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saµsk®talak∑aˆas in this context are only conceptually given and not to be identified 
with the causally efficient saµsk®talak∑aˆas which qualify momentary conditioned 
entities" shows "that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas were originally correlated to existence over a 
span of time", he seems to overlook this simple fact. 
 The circumstance, finally, of "the definition in the Pañcavastuka that ‘birth 
causes the origination of the skandhas’ (i.e. the groups of factors constituting a sentient 
being) and that ‘age causes the transformation (lit. maturation) of the skandhas’" cannot 
really be taken to confirm that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas originally referred to the entire 
span of one existence. In a context where the reality of composite objects is doubted, or 
even rejected, the origination of the skandhas is the origination of the dharmas, and the 
transformation of the skandhas is the transformation of the dharmas. There is no need, 
as far as I can see, to take these expressions to mean that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas cause the 
origination and transformation etc. of sentient beings. 
 AvR subsequently gives some further reasons to justify his position. I believe 
that these further reasons are not only non-decisive, but that they actually weaken his 
position. I will therefore, once again, cite the passage in extenso, emphasizing a few 
words which seem to me particularly important (p. 46-48): 
 
In order to demonstrate that the doctrine of the saµsk®talak∑aˆas is not intrinsi-
cally connected with the doctrine of momentariness, reference may also be made 
to the Våts¥putr¥yas-Saµmat¥yas, who did not follow the Sarvåstivådins in their 
acceptance of the momentariness of all conditioned entities, but shared with 
them the doctrine that the saµsk®talak∑aˆas are causally efficient factors which 
determine the existence of the entity they are correlated with, and which in turn 
are qualified by secondary marks. As in the case of the Sarvåstivådins, the 
number of entities tied by the Våts¥putr¥yas-Saµmat¥yas to mental entities was 
not limited to those forces governing the course of the entity's existence, but 
included also a number of factors which determine the entity's quality. Thus they 
taught according to a commentarial tradition on [MËla-madhyamaka-kårikå] 
VII,4 that dharmas — this precludes material entities — are accompanied by 
seven entities, namely by origination, duration, age and impermanence, as well 
as by an entity "possession" (samanvågama) correlating the qualified entity with 
a particular santåna, and by two further entities that determine its spiritual status 
... . In accordance with the Sarvåstivåda doctrine, these seven accompanying 
entities are qualified by a set of further seven entities, so that always fifteen 
entities arise at a time, viz. the principle [sic] entity and seven primary and seven 
secondary accompanying entities. 




In order to demonstrate that the doctrine of the saµsk®talak∑aˆas is not intrinsically con-
nected with the doctrine of momentariness, it would have been interesting to present a 
clear case where the saµsk®talak∑aˆas are applied to non-momentary entities. The 
Våts¥putr¥yas-Saµmat¥yas could in principle provide such an instance, for they do not 
accept the momentariness of material entities. Unfortunately for the demonstration, 
material entities are excluded from the range of entities accompanied by the 
saµsk®talak∑aˆas. This means that saµsk®talak∑aˆas accompany, even with the 
Våts¥putr¥yas-Saµmat¥yas, only momentary entities. AvR confirms this in a note (p. 47 
n. 94), where he invokes the commentator Avalokitavrata: "Avalokitavrata explains in 
his sub-commentary ... that the princip[al] entity occurs together with its primary and 
secondary marks in one moment [AvR's emphasis], which confirms, given the 
Våts¥putr¥yas-Saµmat¥yas' opposition to the all-encompassing doctrine of 
momentariness, that material entities are not in view in the passage under 
consideration." 
 In view of all this it seems impossible to share AvR's confidence that the 
doctrine of momentariness is more recent than the three or four saµsk®talak∑aˆas of the 
(Sarvåstivåda) Pañcavastuka. This does not, of course, prove the opposite: that the doc-
trine of momentariness is as old as the saµsk®talak∑aˆas of the Pañcavastuka. I yet be-
lieve that this is a proposition that has much to recommend itself. It seems in any case 
unnatural to separate the question of momentariness from the dharma-theory, with its 
pronounced preference for constituents as against composites. 
 
 One would have liked to see the parallelism between the doctrine of momentari-
ness and the dharma-theory taken into consideration elsewhere, too. As is well-known, 
the dharmas, the elements of existence of the Abhidharma schools, came to be looked 
upon as ultimately non-existent, especially in Mahåyåna. It is also in early Mahåyåna 
texts, as documented by AvR (p. 79 f.), that moments loose whatever duration they had. 
Indeed, at least one text "equates the denial of the duration of conditioned entities with 
the denial of their existence" (p. 80). Momentariness and dharmanairåtmya amount here 
apparently to much the same. 
 A particularly interesting development takes place with Vasubandhu, who ad-
vances an argument "proving that destruction cannot by any kind of cause whatsoever 
be caused. He maintains that destruction cannot be caused, because it is mere non-
existence and as such does not qualify as an effect." (p. 187) The consequence is, of 
course, that the entity is destroyed as soon as it comes into being, so that nothing exists 
for any duration whatsoever. Here one is reminded of the argument in the Viµßatikå of 
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(the same?) Vasubandhu proving the impossibility of atoms of finite size. Is the 
parallelism due to coincidence, or does it reflect two sides of the same coin? 
 
 There is no reason to disagree with AvR's conclusion to the extent that it is 
likely that the doctrine of momentariness is primarily based on the analysis of change. 
Yet this analysis of change took place in a context in which also other forms of analysis 
took place, primarily into dharmas. This circumstance does not receive, as it seems to 
me, sufficient attention in this book. This is to be regretted, because in most other 
respects this is likely to remain the most thorough and complete investigation of the 
origins and early history of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness for some time to 
come. 
